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Abstract:  
In this study, we empirically test the impact of taxation on the long-term growth of a sample 
of 32 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The results indicate a zero effect of taxation on long-
term growth. Moreover, the results suggest a significant negative effect of indirect taxes and 
taxes on individuals in short term. Consequently, the use of taxation as an instrument of 
intervention is not appropriate in the region. The countries of the region could therefore 
increase their growth, if the design of fiscal policy rests solely on logic of fiscal neutrality. 
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Introduction 
Taxation in developing countries is a strategic tool of the highest order. It makes it possible to 
finance the provision of public goods such as infrastructure, education, health and justice, 
which are essential for growth. But beyond that, taxation affects individual savings, work and 
training decisions; production, job creation, investment and business innovation; as well as the 
choice of savings instruments and assets by investors (OECD, 2009). All these decisions are 
affected not only by the level of taxes, but also by the way in which the different fiscal 
instruments are designed and combined to generate government revenues. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, taxation is perceived as a brake on growth. Tax rules are insufficiently 
tailored to the taxpayer's specificity, and very often do not take into account the weak 
administrative capacity available in the countries of the region. Faced with this situation, 
countries in the region have embarked on reforms aimed at alleviating the burden of tax 
structures that are hampering economic growth. These reforms are generally aimed at creating 
a tax environment that encourages savings, investment, entrepreneurship and labor. They are 
not necessarily aimed at lowering the tax burden but seek to redefine the tax structure that 
would minimize the negative impact of taxes on growth while preserving fiscal revenues. In 
practice, these reforms have introduced tariff and tax rate reductions that have not always 
succeeded in widening the domestic tax base. 
In this context, economic growth in the region has slowed significantly in recent years. It fell 
to 3.4% in 2015, its lowest level in the past 15 years, and could continue to slow to 1.6%, 
namely well below the rates of 5% to 7% recorded during the past decade (IMF, 2016). For 
countries in the region, that prioritize fiscal policy as an instrument of intervention, this 
situation revives the debate on the role that tax policy could play. The crucial question is: Are 
tax policy can improve growth? 
To the extent that African countries have embarked on poverty reduction strategies, which 
will lead to significant recurrent costs, and with revenue losses caused by the increasing 
liberalization of economies, it is important that domestic revenues be higher to prevent a rapid 
increase in public debt. It is also essential to reduce the negative externalities of taxation on 
economic growth so as not to hamper development. These two imperatives require the 
construction of a tax system that is both income-generating and growth-friendly. This raises 
another question: is there a beneficial tax structure to growth? 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyze the experience of sub-Saharan African 
countries. The main objective of this study is therefore to evaluate empirically the impact of 
taxation on the economic growth of sub-Saharan African countries (SSA), using the DCCE 
approach of Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Period 1980-2010. More specifically, the study 
explores the relative impact of different components of tax revenues on economic 
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growth. Few studies have analyzed the influence of different tax instruments on the growth of 
SSA countries. One reason for the limited number of empirical studies on the subject in the 
region has been the lack of reliable data on taxation, including the various components of tax 
revenues. But this gap was filled by Mansour (2014). Using this data, the paper marginally 
contributes to the empirical literature, showing how different types of taxes specifically affect 
growth in SSA, distinguishing between resource-rich and resource-poor countries. 
The rest of this article includes 5 sections. After a brief presentation of the African tax policy, 
we review the theoretical and empirical results on taxation and growth. We then present a 
framework for methodological analysis before presenting and discussing the results. 
Tax Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Evolution of different tax revenues 
Tax revenues
2
 have evolved in recent years (see Graph 1). On average, they increased from 
12% in 2000 to more than 15% of GDP in 2010. This reflects an increase in revenue from 
consumption taxes and an improvement in direct taxes. Graph 2 shows the annual average of 
indirect taxes (denoted IC) and direct taxes in shares of total non-natural resource tax 
revenues. Overall, indirect taxes are the dominant force in tax revenue. This is not 
surprising, given that since its introduction in the 1990s, VAT has met with success in the 
countries of the region. The ease of implementation and the low economic cost of VAT have 
favored the mobilization of significant revenues. Thus, the share of indirect revenues in the 
countries studied rose from 27% in 1990 to 43% of total tax revenues in 2010. 
Direct taxes have not grown as high as indirect taxes. From 27% in 1990 these taxes will 
decline to around 25% between 1991 and 1998. This decline coincides according to Mansour 
(2014) with the increase in revenues from natural resources in the same period. Mansour 
(2014) argues that this decline is the result of a deliberate policy of substituting taxes on 
natural resources for direct taxes and of relaxing audit rules for companies and 
individuals. The reasons for this decrease could also be sought on the investment incentives 
side. Indeed in many countries of the region the desire to attract foreign investment will lead 
to the creation of investment codes with numerous exemptions and tax exemptions. Most tax 
incentives have consisted of tax holidays
3
 and other instruments to reduce the effective rate 
of corporate tax. According to Cleeve (2008), these incentives have not been effective and 
have contributed to exacerbating problems related to governance and corruption. From 1999 
onwards, direct taxes will increase to around 30% in 2010. This increase is marked by an 
increase in both personal income taxes (denoted IRP) and corporate taxes (denoted IS) (Graph 
2). 
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However, the evolution of tax revenues has not been uniform in the region. Analyzing 
revenue through the prism of natural resources weight in the rich countries, it appears a 
significant difference (Graph 3) in poor (RPC) and rich in natural resources countries 
(RRC
4
). Since 1990, RPCs have mobilized more non-resourced tax revenues than RRCs. On 
the other hand, the share of indirect taxes in revenues was higher among RPCs. Conversely, 
the share of direct taxes in revenues was higher in the RRCs. On average, the share of 
internal indirect taxes was 45.7% for RPCs, compared with 37.6% for RRCs between 2000 
and 2010. Personal and corporate taxes represented 15.6% and 13% respectively for RRC, 
while in RPCs they were 12% and 11.7%. 
Problem of Sub-Saharan taxation 
In sub-Saharan Africa, as in other developing countries, the primary objective of fiscal policy 
is the mobilization of revenues. Faced with increasing costs and instability of external sources 
of development financing
5
, mobilization of adequate tax revenues, stable and predictable is as 
imperative to finance the provision of public goods. However, as in many developing 
countries, there are several difficulties in mobilizing revenues in the region. First, the low 
level of the wealth produced
6 significantly limits the ability to pay the debt. Indeed, Tanzi and 
Zee (2001) emphasize that the level of taxation follows the process of development and 
industrialization. Second, revenue mobilization is limited by the fact that the distribution of 
tax burden is not equitable (Tanzi and Zee, 2001). According to Itriago (2011), the bulk of the 
tax burden is borne by the underprivileged classes, under the action of privileged groups. 
Another problem stems from the lack of accountability in policies that creates a sense of 
injustice in the taxpayer. Martinez and Togler (2008) show that revenue mobilization 
increases with political accountability and the ability of taxpayers to sanction decision-
makers. Unfortunately, in sub-Saharan Africa, this relationship is biased by public support, 
often guided by geopolitical interests. 
Faced with these different constraints, the countries of the region undertook various 
reforms. But without a clear and precise match between fiscal reforms and the development 
strategy, reforms are struggling to prove their effectiveness. Indeed fiscal policy is shared 
neutrality and interventionism, and between the redistribution of income and the promotion of 
economic growth. The ambiguity and diversity of the ends pursued thus constitute another 
brake on efficiency. While it is true that a high rate of growth associated with an equitable 
distribution of wealth is ideal, their reconciliation is difficult (Hamzaoui et al., 2017). A 
choice is therefore necessary and this requires answering the following question: greater 
equality, at prices of growth retardation is preferable? 
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Given the relatively low GDP of sub-Saharan economies, income redistribution brings 
relatively little to low-income groups, much less than what its advocates claim (Itriago, 
2011). Charging the rich can be politically advantageous, but it does not improve the overall 
purchasing power. The solution to the problem of redistribution is based on an ethical choice 
regarding the importance to be attributed to income distribution and growth in the short and 
long term (Hamzaoui et al., 2017). Thus, taxation should initially encourage and stimulate 
economic growth, as low-income groups have more to gain from rapid economic expansion 
than from a policy of income redistribution that is likely to be that of poverty (Moummi, 
2012). The goal of reducing inequality can only be achieved through relatively high and 
sustainable economic growth. 
The search for strong and sustainable growth raises another question. Should taxation move 
towards more neutrality or more interventionism? In liberal developed countries, growth 
depends to a large extent on the dynamism of private enterprise. But in the developing world, 
the private sector remains weak. This deficiency in private enterprise necessitates State action, 
which must then replace the private entrepreneur (Hamzaoui et al., 2017). Therefore, 
budgetary choices become essential. The lack of resources and the size of the needs require 
some rationalization of budgetary choices. There is also a need to promote a fiscal policy that 
can mobilize significant resources. But since sustainable growth is based on an optimal 
allocation of production factors, it is important that taxation does not impede the optimal 
allocation of production factors. This implies that taxation is neutral from the point of view of 
social and economic incentives. However, very often this growth objective has been translated 
into sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), by a more complex tax regime due to tax exemptions or lower 
effective tax rates caused by tax competition between states. These changes influence either 
tax revenues or capital inflows and outflows. This in turn affects the economic growth of 
competing countries (Fayçal and Saloua, 2016). 
This interventionism of the African States to revive the economy is incompatible with the 
search for neutrality, which is of capital importance according to Laure (1953, 1957).  First, 
because productivity’ gains are due to neutrality in relation to the production process and the 
division of labor. Second, the neutrality with respect to the formation of prices of goods and 
factors of production, expresses the real economic rarity: it is therefore necessary to avoid that 
the tax levies bias this system of prices, at the risk of arriving at suboptimal decisions. Finally, 
neutrality in relation to the factor of production avoids waste in terms of capital. 
Literature review 
Theoretical predictions 
The relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth has found a wide scope in the 
growth literature. However, the theoretical study on the effect of fiscal policy on economic 
growth is still inconclusive (Tosun and Abizadeh, 2005). 
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The neoclassical growth models of public policy (see, for example, Judd, 1985, Chamley, 
1986) give fiscal policy the role of determining the level of output rather than the long-term 
rate of growth. The equilibrium growth rate is based on exogenous factors such as population 
growth and technological progress, whereas fiscal policy can only affect the process of 
transition to this state of equilibrium. On the other hand, models of endogenous public policy 
growth (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Stokey and Rebelo, 1995, Mendoza et al, 1997) 
provide mechanisms by which fiscal policy can determine both the level of Production and 
growth rate at equilibrium. These endogenous growth models suggest that taxation can have a 
negative effect and a positive effect on the growth rate. The positive effect is indirectly driven 
by tax-financed spending. If taxes are used to finance investments in public goods, especially 
goods generating positive externalities (infrastructure, education and public health), economic 
growth rate can be positively influenced by taxation. The negative effect of taxation on 
growth stems from the modification of individuals' decisions in the direction of sub-
optimality. Engen and Skinner (1996) suggest five possible mechanisms by which taxes can 
affect economic growth: (1) the rate of investment may be hindered by taxes such as corporate 
and personal income and capital gains taxes; (2) taxes can slow the growth of labor supply by 
distorting leisure and leisure choices; (3) tax policy can affect productivity growth through its 
discouraging effect on research and development (R & D) spending; (4) taxes may result in a 
flow of resources to other (less taxed) sectors likely to have lower productivity; and (5) high 
taxes on labor supply can distort the efficient use of human capital by discouraging workers 
from jobs with high tax burdens. 
Empirical work 
General Works 
Empirically, studies on the impact of taxation have been approached in different ways, 
leading to different results as well. Miller and Russek (1997) applied the panel’s method to 
data from 39 countries of different development levels (developed and developing countries) 
over the period 1975-1984. First, they find a positive correlation between corporate tax 
revenues and economic growth using the total sample. Second, they do not find a significant 
relationship between the taxation of domestic consumption and growth. In the case of 
developed countries, there is a negative correlation between the taxation of personal income, 
social security contributions and growth. For developing countries, they find a positive 
correlation between corporate tax and personal tax on the one hand, and economic growth on 
the other. 
Kneller Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) estimate the effects of different types of taxes on a 
panel of 22 OECD countries between 1970 and 1995. They differ in their study of the taxes-
distorting
7 and neutral tax8, as well as other elements of the budget. Their pooling and fixed 
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effects estimates suggest that a higher level of distorting taxes (as a ratio of total GDP) 
reduces per capita income. Nevertheless, the baseline results are not robust when the authors 
use the instrumental variable estimation to address the potential endogeneity of the tax 
variables. 
Widmalm (2001) using Leamer extreme bond analysis, showed data from 23 countries over 
the period 1965-1990 that the tax on personal income has a negative impact on growth Unlike 
the consumption tax. Lee and Gordon (2005) found the corporate income tax rate to have a 
negative impact on growth by applying the panel estimation method to data from 70 
developed and developing countries over the period 1980-1997. 
Angepoulos, Economides and Kammas (2006) find that the taxation of labor income has a 
negative impact on growth, while corporate tax and capital income tax have a positive impact 
on growth. They find these results by applying the panel’s method to a sample of 23 OECD 
countries. 
Arnold (2008; 2011) uses an error correction panel on data from 21 OECD countries over the 
period 1970-2005. He finds that taxes on wealth, and in particular periodic taxes on real 
estate, are the most favorable to growth, followed immediately by taxes on 
consumption. Individual income taxes are significantly less favorable, and corporate income 
taxes have the most negative effects on GDP per capita. 
Xing (2012) uses an empirical analysis based on the error correction model data from OECD 
countries. First, it finds that the personal income tax, the corporate income tax or the 
consumption taxes are associated with a lower per capita income level in the long term. He 
concludes that in order to promote growth, there is no evidence that personal income taxes are 
better than corporate income taxes, or that consumption taxes are better than income taxes. 
Santiago and Yoo (2012) analyzed 69 countries ranked among high-income, middle-income 
and low-income countries over the period 1970-2009. It uses an error correction model for 
this purpose. First they find that income taxes, social security contributions and personal 
income taxes have a strong negative association with growth as corporate income taxes. Then 
they find that the property tax has a strong positive association with growth. Finally, a 
reduction in income taxes and an increase in value added taxes on sales are also associated 
with faster growth. However, they report that their results are applicable to high-income and 
middle-income countries, but not to low-income countries. 
Mehrara, Masoumib, and Barkhi (2014), looking at the effect of fiscal policy on economic 
growth and inflation, find that using the PVAR approach a shock in tax revenues in the short 
term Long-term economic growth has no effect on growth. They also find that indirect taxes 
have more effect than other types of taxes at the macroeconomic level. Their analysis is based 
on a sample of 14 developing countries over the period 1990-2011. 
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Hakim, Karia and Bujang (2014) examine the impact of indirect taxes, especially VAT, on 
economic growth in developing and developed countries using the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimator. They find that indirect taxes are negatively correlated with economic growth in 
developing countries, and significantly and positively correlated with economic growth in 
developed countries. They conclude that the implementation of the current flat rate VAT is 
less effective in raising higher revenues and stimulating growth in developing countries. The 
implementation of current VAT should therefore be revised in order to generate higher 
revenues and economic growth without seriously affecting the consumption and real per 
capita income of developing countries. 
Arachi, Bucci and Casarico (2015) studied the relationship between growth and tax structure 
using implicit tax rates and tax ratios as indicators. They apply for these estimator common 
effects correlated
9
 on a sample of 15 OECD countries from 1965 to 2011. They found that the 
link between tax structure and long-term per capita GDP is not robust when the hypothesis 
Unobservable heterogeneity between countries is adopted. These results are confirmed by 
Baiardi, Profeta, Puglisi and Scabrosetti (2017). 
Overall, this work resulted in various and sometimes contradictory results depending on the 
period or sample. Apparent contradictions can be attributed to the different econometric 
methodologies used, and to the characteristics specific to different economies during 
alternative periods. Moreover, most of the work concerned OECD countries. As a result, the 
results of these analyzes can’t be generalized to all other countries and especially to SSA 
countries. The debate on the relationship between fiscal policy and growth therefore remains 
open and requires further investigation. 
Sub-Saharan Africa specific work 
Various empirical studies have investigated the effects of taxes on economic growth. The 
results are far from conclusive, varying according to the countries, the methodologies and the 
tax variables involved. This section presents earlier empirical work on African countries. 
Keho (2010) who adopted the Scully regression models and quadratic concludes that higher 
taxes are strongly correlated with reduced economic growth in Cote d'Ivoire. A similar 
negative relationship between the tax burden and the economic growth rate in Nigeria and 
South Africa was reported by Saibu (2015). In another study Keho (2013) adopting the linear 
programming methodology of Branson and Lovell (2001) finds that higher taxes are 
associated with reduced economic growth. 
Wisdom (2014) applied Granger's cointegration and causality tests and found that tax 
revenues had a positive and statistically significant impact on Ghana's economic growth both 
in the long term and in the short term. 
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Sekou (2015) in his study uses the ordinary least squares method, and reports a significant and 
positive correlation between tax collection and growth in Mali. Chigbu et al. (2011), Ogbona 
and Appah (2012), and Confidence and Ebipanipre (2014) found similar results. Their results 
suggest that tax reform is positively and significantly related to economic growth in Nigeria. 
Keho (2011) finds that there is a long-term relationship between the different tax revenues 
with the exception of direct taxes and growth in Cote d'Ivoire. It finds a two-way causality 
between tax revenues and long-term production, which implies a virtuous circle of taxes and 
GDP. Direct taxes, however, did not cause GDP in the short and long term. These results 
suggest that tax revenues depend on economic activity, and reducing the tax burden from 
direct taxes to indirect taxes is likely to have a positive effect on growth. 
Ugwunta and Ugwuanyi (2015) applied an estimate of panel data under the assumption of a 
fixed unobservable effect. They find that taxes on income, profits, capital gains, taxes on 
payroll and labor, property taxes, estates, fixed assets and financial transactions have a 
negative and insignificant effect. On the other hand, indirect taxes have a positive and 
insignificant effect on the economic growth of sub-Saharan African countries. A similar result 
was obtained by N'Yilimon (2014) using the unit root test on the panel data. He suggests that 
there is no non-linear link between taxation and economic growth in the West African 
Economic Monetary Union (UEMOA) countries. Dasalegn (2014), using the ordinary least 
squares method, finds that VAT receipts play a significant and positive role in the national 
development of Ethiopia. Edame and Okoi (2014), and Lawrence (2015) interested in the 
effect of VAT on economic growth in Kenya found a significant and negative relationship 
between the two variables. 
Empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis is performed by estimating an error correction model specified as 
follows: 
                      
      
 
 
    
      
 
 
     
     
 
 
    
     
 
 
             
(1)  
Where         is the log of real GDP per capita of country i in year t.      
   epresents 
investment in physical capital.      
   epresents the tax variables, i.e. total revenues as a 
percentage of GDP or tax revenues from internal taxes (corporate taxes, personal taxes and 
consumption taxes). The variables      and     represent respectively the temporal effect and 
the individual effect specific to each country.     represents the term idiosyncratic error. 
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The parameters   
 
 and    
  represent the long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
logarithm of real GDP per capita, respectively, investment and fiscal variables. The 
parameters   
 
 and   
  capture the short-term relationship between the logarithm of real GDP 
per capita, respectively, investment and fiscal variables. The parameter     indicates the 
economy's speed of convergence to the long-term balance. The term in parenthesis represents 
the cointegration relationship as we seek to identify in our approach. To estimate the model, 
equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
         
            
      
 
 
    
      
 
 
    
     
 
 
    
     
 
 
             
(2)  
Long-term parameters   
 
 and   
  can be calculated from   
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 , as follows:   
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     . The e parameter   
  gives an overview of the presence of a long-
run equilibrium relationship: if   
    there is no cointegration and model reduces to a 
regression with variables in first difference. By cons if   
   , the variables in the 
parenthesis of equation (1) maintain a cointegration. In this case, after shock, the economy 
returns to its long-term equilibrium path. 
To control for unobservable common shocks and for the omitted variables cointegration 
relationship, we follow the approach DCCE
10 proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) by 
including in the regression averages cross all the variables of the model. Equation (2) 
becomes: 
         
            
      
 
 
    
      
 
 
    
     
 
 
    
     
 
 
   
                
      
 
 
    
      
 
 
                    
        
 
 
    
        
 
 
             
(3)  
Recent studies have shown that the DCCE is an effective method to overcome many 
difficulties. First, this method allows each country to have its own slope coefficients on both 
the observed explanatory variables and unobserved common factors. Then, DCCE is robust 
method for estimating non-stationary panels with different types of cross-dependencies errors 
(Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2013; Chudik and Pesaran, 2015). However, this approach may 
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suffer a slight bias when the time dimension is moderate. To correct this bias, we apply to all 
estimates, the average readjustment recursive method proposed by Chudik and Pesara (2015). 
The DCCE estimator may be invalid when the model to be estimated comprises a lagged 
dependent variable and / or weakly exogenous variables such regressors, as is the case in our 
model. In this case, Chudik and Pesaran (2015) show that the DCCE approach continues to be 
valid if a sufficient number of shifts average cross the model or additional control variables 
are included in the equation (3). Therefore, we follow this procedure to check the robustness 
of our results. 
Data 
Our sample comprises 32 SSA countries with a representation of RRC parity and RPC. The 
data cover the period from 1980 to 2010. The sample design was guided by data availability. 
The investment is used as a proxy of capital. The data on real GDP growth rate per capita is 
taken from the World Bank database (WDI). The investment is taken from the IMF database 
(WEO 2015). All fiscal variables are taken from the FERDI development indicators. 
In order to perform robustness checks, we include in the empirical model two additional 
variables: trade openness, calculated as the sum of exports and imports to GDP, and a proxy 
public expenditure, calculated as the ratio of final consumption of general government in 
GDP.  Proxies of trade openness and public expenditures are taken from the World Bank 
database. 
Results 
Cross-sectional dependence test 
Before starting the empirical analysis, data were subjected to analysis of the dependence in 
cross section. The independence of errors between individuals (correlation [       ] = 0) is an 
important property for the estimation of panel data. When violated, ordinary estimators are 
biased and inconsistent (Sarafidis and De Hoyos, 2006). Indeed, a strong dependency between 
errors greatly reduces the efficiency of the least squares estimator (Phillips and Sul, 2003) and 
makes estimates using instrumentation inconsistent variables (Sarafidis and Robertson, 2006). 
However when this dependence is relatively small, it does not need to be taken into account in 
the data analysis because its effect is negligible (Chudik et al, 2011). Thus, we test the 
dependence with the test proposed by Pesaran (2015). Under the null hypothesis of weak 
dependence, the test P-value is 0.00. The P-value is less than the 5% significance level which 
leads to reject the null hypothesis of weak dependence. 
12 
 
 
Unit root test 
Stationary is important property when you want to use the temporal dimension of 
macroeconomic variables. The unit root test information on the stationary or non-stationary 
time series. The unit root presence dramatically affects the asymptotic properties of tests and 
estimates temporal series (Granger and Newbold, 1974). The use of stationary test avoids 
false regressions involving non-stationary variables. In this section we conduct unit root tests 
for panel data, since the individual unit root tests are known for their low power (Cochrane, 
1991), especially if the time dimension is limited. 
Validation of cross-sectional dependence in the data implies that the negligence of 
unobserved common factors could skew the usual unit root tests in panel. Due to some gaps in 
our data, we test the existence of unit root tests thanks to Choi (2001), Im, Pesaran and Shin
11
 
(2003), of Maddala and Wu (1999) and Pesaran (2007). With the exception of test Maddala 
and Wu, other procedures offer the opportunity to reflect dependence of individuals. All tests 
are testing the null hypothesis of non-stationary against the alternative of stationary of the 
variables while providing the opportunity to consider the issue. The tests of Maddala and Wu 
(1999) and Choi (2001) are Fisher tests. They perform individually Dickey and Fuller test, 
and Phillips and Perron test. They then combine the P-value of individual unit root tests for 
the final statistics. However the test Choi (2001) is distinguished from the test Maddala and 
Wu (1999) by the use of alternative methods of combinations. Three methods differ according 
to whether they use the inverse transformation   , the reverse-normal and reverse logit P-
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value, and the fourth method is a modification of the inverse transformation of    that is 
suitable when N approaches infinity. The normal and reverse inverse transformation logit can 
be used when N is finite or infinite. The IPS test combines the information of the size of the 
time series with that of the dimension of the cross section, so that less time observations are 
necessary for the test has the power. This procedure makes separate unit root tests for N cross 
sections. The final result of the test is based on the average of N statistics Dickey-fuller 
Increased (ADF). The Pesaran unit root test (2007), still little known, is to estimate for each 
individual equation (4), and obtain the statistical Dickey-Fuller   . The final statistic called 
CIPS is obtained by averaging the individual statistics Dickey-Fuller increased. The test 
provides a truncated version of the CIPS denoted CIPS*, to avoid any influence of extreme 
results that might occur for samples with low dimension T. The test results are shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. For all variables, the P-value is mostly below the 5% threshold. These results 
lead us to conclude that all variables are stationary.  
 
Tableau 1 
 
IPS Maddala et WU Pesaran 
 
statistique P-value statistique P-value statistique P-value 
ly -14.2042 0.0000  351.8890 0.0000 -11.127 0.000 
lk -1.5386 0.0620  106.6068 0.0007 -0.967 0.167 
ltax -4.3892 0.0000  86.8168 0.0304 -1.991 0.023 
lIS -4.5583 0.0000  131.6521 0.0000 -1.469 0.071 
lIRP -4.3349 0.0000  100.6977  0.0023 -3.179 0.001 
lIC -3.3953 0.0003  110.0071  0.0003 -4.352 0.000 
 
Tableau 2 
 
Test de Choi (2002) 
 
 Inverse    P-value 
 Inverse 
normal 
P-value 
Inverse 
logit   
P-value  Modified inverse    P-value 
ly 411.8832 0.0000 -15.3959 0.0000 -20.0278 0.0000 30.7488 0.0000 
lk 91.4255 0.0138 -1.6959 0.0449 -1.7967 0.0371 2.4241 0.0077 
ltax 132.7991 0.0000 -4.7784 0.0000 -5.0071 0.0000 6.0810 0.0000 
lIS 138.3071 0.0000 -4.9647 0.0000 -5.2982 0.0000 6.5679 0.0000 
lIRP 129.2464 0.0000 -4.7208 0.0000 -4.8972 0.0000 5.7670 0.0000 
lIC 119.9614 0.0000 -3.6316 0.0001 -3.9824 0.0001 4.9463 0.0000 
Estimation 
In this section we follow Presbitero and Eberhardt (2013) by testing the cointegration from 
estimator Chudik et al (2015). Table 3 summarizes the results of the estimation of long-term 
factors and short-term and the estimated speed of convergence between countries, from the 
DCCE estimator. In column 1, we regress the log of real GDP per capita on investment 
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measures. In columns 2 to 5, we include tax variables. In columns 2 to 5, fiscal policy is 
successively measured by total revenue, followed by the various revenue components. 
The results in Table 3 show that the sign of retarded growth is negative and significant. In 
other words, deviation from the growth of its value predicted by the long-term relationship 
triggers a change in the growth in the opposite direction in order to regain the level of long 
term. The results further suggest that the restoring force is around 1, which implies a growth 
of deflection takes about one year on average to reach its equilibrium level. The estimated 
coefficient of capital is positive and highly significant short-term and long-term low (column 
5). This sign is consistent with results of previous literature. This suggests that there is a long-
term relationship between growth and capital. The long-term coefficients of tax variables are 
negative but not significant. This implies that there is not a long-term relationship between 
growth and tax revenues. The short-term coefficients of tax variables are negative with the 
exception of total revenue. But only the coefficient of revenue from indirect taxes is 
significant. This means that indirect taxes lead to a significant decline in short-term growth. 
This means that indirect taxes lead to a significant decline in short-term growth. This means 
that indirect taxes lead to a significant decline in short-term growth. 
In Table 4, we consider the basic model for RPCs and RRCs. The long-term signs are not 
significant. Direct taxes have negative coefficients in the two groups. The long-term 
coefficient of total revenue is negative for RPC and positive for RRCs. Unlike indirect taxes 
have a long term negative factor for RRCs and positive for RPCs. In the short term we see in 
RPC, a negative and significant impact of receipts from taxes on individuals. 
Robustness analysis 
When the variables are strictly exogenous standard DCCE estimator
12 can be applied. But 
when the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, as is the case in our study, the 
specification used may be subject to bias, especially if the time dimension is moderate. 
Chudik and Pesaran (2015) suggest, then release the assumption of strict exogeneity, 
admitting the possibility of a feedback between the variables of the model. Therefore, they 
propose to add to the equation (3) a sufficient number of delays "t " average cross of the 
dependent variable, control variables, and those of other pertinent variables. 
                                                          
12
 Without cross-section averages 
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(4)  
They suggest that the maximum number of delays "p" is equal to the cube root of temporal 
dimension (   
 
   . We apply this procedure including trade openness and public 
spending. These variables into the empirical model as their average cross in order to help 
capture unobserved common factors, which represent the global shocks and regional benefits. 
Given the moderate temporal dimension of our sample, we can add a maximum delay of one 
year. The results are shown in Tables 5 to 7. Table 5 shows the results for the total sample 
while Tables 6 and 7 show respectively the results for RPC and RRC. In each table, we add 
the average cross without additional variables shift control in columns 1 to 5. In columns 6 to 
10, we add the average transverse additional variables and model variables with a lag of one 
period. 
The results in Table 5 show that all long-term coefficients of tax variables remain negative 
and insignificant. We find a significant negative short-term effect of indirect taxes consistent 
with results in Table 1. In RPC (Table 6), the long-term coefficients of tax variables are 
negative with the exception of tax coefficients on individuals and indirect taxes that are not 
robust. In column 6, the total revenue coefficient is significant. We also note that the short-
term coefficient of taxes on individuals remains significantly negative. Regarding RRCs 
(Table 7), it appears that the signs noted in Table 4 remain unchanged. 
Conclusion 
In recent years, many African countries have tried on numerous occasions to increase their 
GDP through taxation. The empirical evidence on this policy has not been successful despite 
the different data sets, methodologies and fiscal indicators used. In this context, this study 
sought to determine the impact of fiscal policy on growth in sub-Saharan Africa. To achieve 
this goal, our strategy was to empirically estimate the impact of the tax revenue on growth. 
The estimate was made by the DCCE estimator and taking into account the recent 
econometric advances. Diagnostic tests have clearly rejected the cross-data independence. 
Once the observed heterogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity have been properly taken into 
account, we have not detected any robust effect of fiscal policy on long-term growth. Our 
results are similar to those of Ugwunta and Ugwuanyi (2015) and N’Yilimon (2014). 
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Although this article focuses primarily on the long-term relationship between taxes and 
growth, our results draw attention to the significant negative impact of short-term indirect 
taxes for the total sample. This evidence, consistent with the results of Hakim Bujang and 
Karia (2014), suggests that a rise in indirect taxes may reduce short-term growth. Similarly, it 
seems that taxes on individuals are particularly harmful in poor countries with natural 
resources. 
In terms of policy recommendations, these results imply that the use of taxation to promote 
growth is inappropriate, since the tax to an overall negative impact on growth in the region 
(although this impact is not significant). Countries should therefore continue to reform their 
tax systems to mitigate the distortions caused by taxation. An effective way to increase 
revenue and promote growth would be to work towards the emergence of a neutral tax system 
with respect to the behavior of economic agents in the same spirit as Lauré (1957). To achieve 
this goal, all countries in the region would benefit from ongoing tax reforms, by placing the 
logic of fiscal neutrality in the heart of the design of reform policies. 
Various reforms are possible to allow the tax to generate the minimum possible distortions. A 
first way of reform could affect income tax is often perceived as inappropriate. Governments 
could, perhaps, move to a proportional tax, in logic of efficiency. Until the tax administration 
capacities are higher, this would prevent tax evasion and simplify the taxation of individuals. 
In this case the reduction of inequalities could be done through targeted spending. 
Concerning corporate taxes, reforms are also possible. Governments should first reduce tax 
exemptions and benefits, especially in the context of investment codes. Then, the increase in 
the tax base should be followed by a reduction in the different tax rates, ideally with a single 
nominal rate of taxation of profit which is equal to the rate actually applied. In addition, to 
offset the pressure on formal sector firms, the tax rate is expected to decline as a result of a 
stable increase in the tax base. This could boost the competitiveness of enterprises and 
encourage economic activity. Another area of reform concerns the depreciation system. 
Governments should first reduce the number of asset classes. This action would then be 
followed by the application of a single depreciation rate for each category. These depreciation 
rates should be higher than the rate normally required for the physical life of the asset to 
compensate for the absence of an appropriate mechanism to account for inflation that 
characterizes most tax regimes. Finally, decreasing depreciation should be preferred to 
straight-line depreciation. 
Regarding indirect taxes, their potential could be improved through further reform of VAT. 
Many studies (see Gupta, 2007) argue that it has a greater potential to improve the 
performance of income in developing countries, compared to taxes on traditional products, for 
a number of reasons. It should therefore be to improve the policy on VAT to make some 
regressive. This involves the removal of VAT exemptions, to increase his plate. These 
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exemptions (and progressive taxation) could be replaced by a spending policy targeting the 
poor and vulnerable households. Such initiatives would support a reduction in inequality and 
greater compliance with the taxation. Policymakers should also apply a single rate to avoid 
distorting the structure of relative prices to consumers. This practice would be more effective 
with a high registration threshold, so as to retain as collectors that businesses can fulfill their 
reporting obligations and to master their costs of collecting VAT. In addition to this, 
governments should work to establish an effective mechanism for repayment of structural 
VAT credits generated by the deduction mechanism, and end the withholding order not to 
affect the financial situation of companies. Finally, these recommendations can give greater 
results if policy makers improve their efforts to eliminate fraud, tax evasion, corruption and 
pursue fiscal decentralization. 
This study is far from being free of any limit. One limitation is that the study focuses on the 
central tendency of the panel. This approach could mask the presence of nonlinearities in 
some countries, which are removed when you consider the average effects. Outside, as 
recently suggested Jaimovich and Rebelo (2012), the effects of taxation on growth could be 
nonlinear. Indeed, marginal increases in tax rates have little impact on growth when they are 
low to moderate. However, their impact on growth can be important if the rates are high. 
Empirical study of nonlinear effects on growth taxes would be a very relevant topic for future 
research. 
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Annexe 
 
Graph 1 : Evolution of tax revenues 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Evolution of direct and indirect revenue as a percentage of tax revenue 
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Graphique 3 : Comparison of revenue performance between RPC and RRC. IS = Corporate tax revenues as a percentage of 
tax revenues. IRP = personal tax revenues as a percentage of tax revenues. IC = internal indirect tax revenues as a 
percentage of tax revenues. Tax = tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. 
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Tableau 3 : Basic model for total sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly 
      
D.lk 0.0378*** 0.0344*** 0.0284** 0.0362*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0125) (0.0129) 
D.ltax  0.00919    
  (0.0196)    
L.ly -1.044*** -1.130*** -1.102*** -1.108*** -1.124*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0370) (0.0453) (0.0457) (0.0424) 
L.lk 0.0117 0.0213 0.0105 0.0148 0.0251* 
 (0.00989) (0.0159) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0136) 
L.ltax  -0.0119    
  (0.0224)    
D.lIS   -0.00222   
   (0.00894)   
L.lIS   -0.00345   
   (0.00889)   
D.lIRP    -0.0144  
    (0.0110)  
L.lIRP    -0.0166  
    (0.0133)  
D.lIC     -0.0228* 
     (0.0127) 
L.lIC     -0.0158 
     (0.0174) 
Constant -0.00644 -0.000109 -0.0113 -0.00441 -0.0171 
 (0.00517) (0.00651) (0.0117) (0.00551) (0.0169) 
      
Observations 929 927 919 927 926 
R-squared 0.583 0.665 0.690 0.630 0.644 
Number of groups 32 32 32 32 32 
Fisher 3.677 2.804 3.101 2.408 2.554 
Adj. R-squared 0.583 0.665 0.690 0.630 0.644 
CD test statistic -1.207 -0.191 -1.501 -1.175 -0.968 
CD P-value 0.228 0.848 0.133 0.240 0.333 
RMSE 0.0572 0.0554 0.0500 0.0573 0.0569 
Number of obs. 929 927 919 927 926 
Number of group 32 32 32 32 32 
Obs. per group 29.03 28.97 28.72 28.97 28.94 
Cross sectional lags 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tableau 4 : Basic model estimate with distinction between RPC and RRC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly 
           
D.lk 0.0546*** 0.0449** 0.0580*** 0.0576*** 0.0645*** 0.0292** 0.0307** 0.0296* 0.0274** 0.0405*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0167) (0.0119) (0.0146) 
D.ltax  0.0126     -0.00579    
  (0.0333)     (0.0277)    
L.ly -1.091*** -1.139*** -1.093*** -1.110*** -1.119*** -0.887*** -0.948*** -0.977*** -0.955*** -1.001*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0516) (0.0599) (0.0583) (0.0572) (0.0619) (0.0574) (0.0607) (0.0595) (0.0672) 
L.lk 0.0184* 0.0464 0.0241 0.0263** 0.0371 0.0119 0.0206 0.0330* 0.0145 0.0244 
 (0.00943) (0.0287) (0.0178) (0.0109) (0.0232) (0.0160) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0217) (0.0184) 
L.ltax  -0.0226     0.0126    
  (0.0315)     (0.0218)    
D.lIS   -0.00533     0.00607   
   (0.0113)     (0.00892)   
L.lIS   -0.0121     -0.0196   
   (0.0110)     (0.0126)   
D.lIRP    -0.0213*     -0.0241  
    (0.0116)     (0.0152)  
L.lIRP    -0.00957     -0.0271  
    (0.00879)     (0.0187)  
D.lIC     -0.0184     0.00298 
     (0.0169)     (0.0169) 
L.lIC     0.00232     -0.0116 
     (0.0135)     (0.0168) 
Constant 0.00401 -0.00108 0.00626 -0.00188 -0.00160 -0.00368 0.00285 -0.00336 0.00212 -0.00594 
 (0.00518) (0.00564) (0.00630) (0.00643) (0.00822) (0.00814) (0.0147) (0.0117) (0.00645) (0.0217) 
           
R-squared 0.668 0.732 0.702 0.707 0.694 0.538 0.622 0.620 0.597 0.673 
Group RPC RPC RPC RPC RPC RRC RRC RRC RRC RRC 
Fisher 5.466 4.031 3.478 3.571 3.343 2.953 2.217 2.136 2.001 2.776 
Adj. R-squared 0.668 0.732 0.702 0.707 0.694 0.538 0.622 0.620 0.597 0.673 
CD test statistic -1.613 -1.005 -1.214 -0.866 -1.095 0.105 0.434 -0.558 -0.152 0.123 
RMSE 0.0455 0.0450 0.0475 0.0467 0.0481 0.0691 0.0689 0.0621 0.0696 0.0634 
CD P-value 0.107 0.315 0.225 0.387 0.273 0.917 0.664 0.577 0.879 0.902 
Number of obs. 476 476 476 476 475 453 451 443 451 451 
Number of group 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Obs. per group 29.75 29.75 29.75 29.75 29.69 28.31 28.19 27.69 28.19 28.19 
cross sectional lags 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tableau 5 : Robustness test total sample (Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly 
           
D.lk 0.0405*** 0.0411*** 0.0367*** 0.0368*** 0.0418*** 0.0463*** 0.0536*** 0.0287 0.0693*** 0.0550*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0153) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0249) (0.0218) (0.0174) 
D.ltax  -0.00601     -0.00725    
  (0.0175)     (0.0260)    
L.ly -1.054*** -1.139*** -1.124*** -1.120*** -1.146*** -1.052*** -1.133*** -1.172*** -1.208*** -1.190*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0409) (0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0492) (0.0518) (0.0578) (0.0705) (0.0597) (0.0523) 
L.lk 0.0129 0.0214 0.0180 0.0172 0.0280* 0.0241* 0.0443** 0.0179 0.0468** 0.0445** 
 (0.0112) (0.0160) (0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0163) (0.0137) (0.0197) (0.0152) (0.0202) (0.0189) 
L.ltax  -0.0135     -0.00532    
  (0.0221)     (0.0262)    
D.lIS   -0.00354     0.00795   
   (0.00842)     (0.0111)   
L.lIS   -0.00681     -0.00147   
   (0.00995)     (0.0172)   
D.lIRP    -0.00760     0.00428  
    (0.00988)     (0.0213)  
L.lIRP    -0.0149     0.000296  
    (0.0128)     (0.0244)  
D.lIC     -0.0217**     -0.0345** 
     (0.00976)     (0.0143) 
L.lIC     -0.0101     -0.0367 
     (0.0148)     (0.0267) 
Constant -0.00707 -0.000278 -0.00980 -0.00391 -0.0116 -0.00566 0.00366 -0.00423 0.0167 0.00383 
 (0.00690) (0.00554) (0.0136) (0.00639) (0.0167) (0.00759) (0.00984) (0.0170) (0.0153) (0.0193) 
           
R-squared 0.615 0.715 0.720 0.650 0.660 0.599 0.736 0.743 0.672 0.707 
Fisher 3.043 2.685 2.700 1.987 2.074 1.523 1.356 1.373 0.997 1.175 
Adj. R-squared 0.615 0.715 0.720 0.650 0.660 0.599 0.736 0.743 0.672 0.707 
CD test statistic -1.175 -0.149 -1.389 -0.882 -0.529 -1.399 0.0590 -0.976 0.362 -1.531 
CD P-value 0.240 0.882 0.165 0.378 0.597 0.162 0.953 0.329 0.717 0.126 
RMSE 0.0554 0.0518 0.0484 0.0557 0.0555 0.0570 0.0530 0.0477 0.0588 0.0573 
Number of obs. 929 927 919 927 926 905 904 896 904 904 
Number of group 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Obs. per group 29.03 28.97 28.72 28.97 28.94 28.28 28.25 28 28.25 28.25 
cross sectional lags 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
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Tableau 6 : Robustness test for RPC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly 
           
D.lk 0.0507*** 0.0428** 0.0514*** 0.0555** 0.0605*** 0.0578*** 0.0734** 0.0582** 0.0480** 0.0606* 
 (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0185) (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0192) (0.0316) (0.0226) (0.0233) (0.0327) 
D.ltax  0.0134     0.0149    
  (0.0314)     (0.0316)    
L.ly -1.092*** -1.139*** -1.102*** -1.101*** -1.126*** -1.109*** -1.114*** -1.150*** -1.143*** -1.186*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0485) (0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0546) (0.0512) (0.0662) (0.0674) (0.0665) (0.0543) 
L.lk 0.0148* 0.0392 0.0256* 0.0262** 0.0313 0.0146** 0.0573* 0.0180 0.0221** 0.0442 
 (0.00786) (0.0267) (0.0152) (0.0110) (0.0198) (0.00713) (0.0297) (0.0210) (0.0102) (0.0269) 
L.ltax  -0.0239     -0.0401*    
  (0.0322)     (0.0214)    
D.lIS   -0.000818     0.00597   
   (0.0109)     (0.0108)   
L.lIS   -0.00993     0.000570   
   (0.0110)     (0.0113)   
D.lIRP    -0.0216*     -0.0219*  
    (0.0120)     (0.0131)  
L.lIRP    -0.0105     -0.0166  
    (0.00903)     (0.0129)  
D.lIC     -0.0227     -0.0165 
     (0.0179)     (0.0173) 
L.lIC     -0.000892     0.00390 
     (0.0136)     (0.0105) 
Constant 0.00316 -0.00142 0.00815 -0.000988 -0.000839 0.00259 0.00479 0.00990 -0.00343 -0.00310 
 (0.00458) (0.00607) (0.00557) (0.00574) (0.00798) (0.00387) (0.00573) (0.00834) (0.00599) (0.00760) 
           
R-squared 0.668 0.732 0.707 0.706 0.699 0.685 0.740 0.739 0.723 0.718 
Fisher 3.974 3.079 2.717 2.704 2.602 2.405 1.571 1.565 1.441 1.398 
Adj. R-squared 0.668 0.732 0.707 0.706 0.699 0.685 0.740 0.739 0.723 0.718 
CD test statistic -1.593 -0.962 -1.217 -0.804 -0.900 -0.965 -0.704 -0.613 -0.333 0.00679 
RMSE 0.0471 0.0473 0.0494 0.0491 0.0501 0.0505 0.0550 0.0548 0.0560 0.0576 
CD P-value 0.111 0.336 0.224 0.421 0.368 0.335 0.482 0.540 0.739 0.995 
Number of obs. 476 476 476 476 475 472 472 472 472 471 
Number of group 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Obs. per group 29.75 29.75 29.75 29.75 29.69 29.50 29.50 29.50 29.50 29.44 
cross sectional lags 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tableau 7 : Robustness test for RRC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly D.ly 
           
D.lk 0.0352** 0.0382*** 0.0341** 0.0299** 0.0471*** 0.0366*** 0.0552** 0.0525** 0.0368* 0.0487*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0166) (0.0124) (0.0156) (0.0117) (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0192) (0.0177) 
D.ltax  -0.0102     -0.0294    
  (0.0271)     (0.0397)    
L.ly -0.894*** -0.956*** -0.992*** -0.959*** -0.998*** -0.890*** -0.942*** -0.984*** -0.992*** -0.965*** 
 (0.0605) (0.0589) (0.0629) (0.0568) (0.0703) (0.0696) (0.0745) (0.0755) (0.0831) (0.0859) 
L.lk 0.0116 0.0206 0.0312 0.0136 0.0254 0.0256 0.0282 0.0535* 0.0404 0.0423 
 (0.0187) (0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0238) (0.0204) (0.0254) (0.0290) (0.0284) (0.0322) (0.0283) 
L.ltax  0.0166     0.0357    
  (0.0215)     (0.0271)    
D.lIS   0.00609     0.0317   
   (0.00851)     (0.0379)   
L.lIS   -0.0188     -0.00469   
   (0.0141)     (0.0297)   
D.lIRP    -0.0195     -0.0244  
    (0.0150)     (0.0200)  
L.lIRP    -0.0265     -0.0441  
    (0.0183)     (0.0286)  
D.lIC     -0.00124     -0.00292 
     (0.0161)     (0.0174) 
L.lIC     -0.0141     -0.0131 
     (0.0175)     (0.0218) 
Constant -0.00350 0.00676 -0.00873 0.00195 -0.00510 -0.00112 0.0123 -0.0105 0.0115* 0.00426 
 (0.00917) (0.0147) (0.0183) (0.00638) (0.0247) (0.0101) (0.0172) (0.0269) (0.00691) (0.0239) 
           
R-squared 0.554 0.649 0.637 0.604 0.708 0.631 0.757 0.659 0.747 0.763 
Fisher 2.275 1.872 1.718 1.548 2.462 1.687 1.434 0.837 1.361 1.482 
Adj. R-squared 0.554 0.649 0.637 0.604 0.708 0.631 0.757 0.659 0.747 0.763 
CD test statistic -0.199 0.0421 -0.782 -0.214 -0.440 -0.0613 0.000736 -0.385 1.666 -0.890 
RMSE 0.0707 0.0700 0.0618 0.0730 0.0630 0.0705 0.0683 0.0673 0.0699 0.0681 
CD P-value 0.843 0.966 0.434 0.831 0.660 0.951 0.999 0.701 0.0957 0.374 
Number of obs. 453 451 443 451 451 445 444 436 444 444 
Number of group 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Obs. per group 28.31 28.19 27.69 28.19 28.19 27.81 27.75 27.25 27.75 27.75 
cross sectional lags 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tableau 8 : Country of sample 
Resources poor countries Resources rich countries 
Benin Lesotho Botswana Ghana 
Burkina Faso Madagascar Cameroon Guinea 
Burundi Malawi 
Central African 
Republic 
Mozambique 
Cabo Verde Mali Chad Namibia 
Comoros Mauritius Congo, Rep. Niger 
Ethiopia Senegal Côte d'Ivoire Sierra Leone 
Gambia, The Swaziland Equatorial Guinea South Africa 
Guinea-Bissau Togo Gabon Tanzania 
 
 
 
 
